Western Sahara and a Fraught Path to Peace

In late July, Morocco secured another diplomatic coup in a string of recent triumphs when France backed its territorial claims over Western Sahara. France joins a growing list of countries, including the United States, to champion the North African kingdom’s plan for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. France’s decision is, however, the source of much consternation among the leaders of the Polisario Front (PF), which fights for independence for the Indigenous Sahrawi ethnic group. But it has also injected newfound optimism among some analysts that peace negotiations will finally resume amid the decades-long conflict in Western Sahara. 

Thomas M. Hill of the U.S. Institute of Peace, for instance, has argued that France’s move will propel the conflict toward a decisive conclusion; that international momentum is now overwhelmingly on Rabat’s side; that France’s reversal in its long-standing policy may prove to be a crucial precedent that many other countries follow; and that dwindling diplomatic support for the PF will force its interlocutors to the negotiating table. 

But such optimism is premature. France’s backing of Morocco’s Western Sahara plan is unlikely to signal the beginning of the end of combat. A considerable degree of divergence in negotiating positions persists, and it is not readily apparent what could narrow the gap. The PF retains its maximalist ambitions of independence; therefore, it would be politically unpalatable for the organization—whose very identity is inextricably tied to Sahrawi self-determination—to accede to such a negotiated settlement. At the same time, the Polisario Front continues to enjoy the full-throttled support of Algeria, which helps sustain its operations and champion its cause in global forums. Shrinking international support for the movement, while not ideal for the PF, is not detrimental to its existence and is thus unlikely to shift the needle toward peace, as the movement can maintain low-level hostilities at a relatively small cost. 

If anything, the conflict may be entering a new, more unpredictable phase. The threat of escalation endures while the rivalry between Rabat and Algiers intensifies, and the regional landscape may change as Morocco’s bid for regional power strengthens and Algeria finds itself more and more isolated. If its deepening diplomatic disarray persists, Algiers may intervene more noticeably in the conflict, while the PF may deploy more aggressive military tactics. Morocco, meanwhile, may want to settle this territorial dispute once and for all. 

The path to peace has only become more uncertain. 

The Origins of the Conflict

The conflict’s roots can be traced back to Spanish colonial rule, which saw the birth of a burgeoning Sahrawi nationalism and later developed into the Polisario Front. After Madrid’s withdrawal from Western Sahara in the mid-1970s, Morocco and Mauritania divided the territory between themselves. In response, the PF waged a war of independence against them, proclaiming a Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976. It framed its movement as an anticolonial struggle between the Western Saharan peripheries and the metropole in Rabat. The SADR found in Algeria its closest ally and military backer, as well as a base for its government-in-exile in Tindouf. It also gained international recognition from scores of other states, most of them from across the Global South. 

Nouakchott renounced its irredentist claims in 1979 after successive military defeats. But across the following decade, Morocco consolidated its control over the majority of Western Sahara and constructed a vast earthen defensive structure. This structure—known as the Berm—separated the Moroccan-administered portion, along the Atlantic Coast, from the land controlled by the PF further in the east, establishing the Western Sahara’s current geographic and political divisions. Morocco occupies the majority of the territory, which it argues is a part of a historic “Greater Morocco”; the PF occupies the remaining 20 percent, even though it claims sovereignty over the entirety of Western Sahara.

After a military stalemate, both sides agreed to a UN-mediated Settlement Planin 1991. This paved the way for a ceasefire and a commitment by Rabat and the PF to hold a referendum on self-determination. The UN deployed a peacekeeping mission, MINURSO, to monitor the ceasefire and oversee the vote. It remains active today, although Moroccan and PF efforts to obstruct MINURSO’s access and activities have rendered it somewhat impotent. 

The referendum, however, was never held. Any progress was beset by disagreements over voter eligibility and the details of the ballot. Morocco refused to participatein any referendum that included an option for independence. A series of subsequent negotiations failed to make any headway, even when a plan received the backing of all UN Security Council permanent members. Rabat’s proposal for an autonomy plan in 2007, meanwhile, was rejected by the PF, which argued that the proposal disaffirmed the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination. 

The ceasefire, however, did hold for several decades. But tensions flared intermittently as protests erupted across Western Sahara. Much of this was fueled by the large-scale displacement of the Sahrawi population, with most living today in refugee camps along the Algerian-Western Saharan border amid a growing humanitarian crisis. 

Low-Level Hostilities

The ceasefire collapsed outright in November 2020, rendering the two core elements of the 1991 agreement failures. Morocco had seized a section of the MINURSO buffer zone to end a blockade by Polisario Front activists of a key route near the Mauritanian border. In response, Brahim Ghali—the PF’s leader—declared that the armed struggle against Morocco would resume. Both sides introduced mass mobilization as clashes spread along the Berm—a devastating blow to the prospect for a permanent political solution. 

Although tensions escalated, the conflict itself has simmered at a low-intensity level. The PF has engaged in long-distance shelling of Moroccan troops and facilities along the Berm, in addition to more traditional guerilla warfare tactics such as hit-and-run raids led by small and mobile Sahrawi units. Most of these attacks have been concentrated in the northeastern part of the contested territory—targeting areas such as Smara and Mahbes—which contain several productive industries including phosphate and iron mining. The limited geographic scope of these attacks implies that the PF is not able to conduct successful operations elsewhere across Western Sahara. It likely lacks the logistical capabilities and resources to project force beyond the immediate vicinity of the Berm. This would limit its ability to carry out operations further west and south in Moroccan-controlled territory. 

Still, the PF has embraced more aggressive tactics over time. Last year, it claimed responsibility for a series of explosions in the city of Smara that killed civilians, amounting to a possible shift from its previous reluctance to target civilians. Morocco, meanwhile, has reportedly used drones to carry out attacks on the PF and targeted assassinations of its senior officials, including the PF’s police chief. According to one PF organization, approximately 80 civilians have been killed in drone strikes since 2021. 

The absence of intense military engagement thus far can be attributed to Rabat’s overwhelming military preponderance, which has helped it establish air superiority. Following the ceasefire, the PF’s armed wing largely demobilized, with many former soldiers moving into refugee camps. The PF also lost one of its principal former arms suppliers—Libya—with the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Algiers, meanwhile, has shown restraint in its provision of military aid for now, likely tempered by fears of unduly provoking Morocco. 

As a result, the PF has an aging inventory of Soviet weaponry that is insufficient to sustain a large-scale, protracted military operation. It makes any direct military escalation into a hot war between Rabat and the PF unlikely, unless Algiers enters the conflict. The prospect of intensifying guerilla warfare activity, however, persists. Support for the war remains strong among pro-PF Sahrawis, even though the campaign has produced few results, and a string of Western governments backing Rabat is unlikely to change this. With this support, the PF could deploy more daring tactics such as targeting military or industrial sites farther inside Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. 

Dwindling Diplomatic Support

Meanwhile, Morocco has been emboldened by an array of diplomatic triumphs. Under the Trump administration, the United States recognized Moroccan claims to Western Sahara, overturning decades of U.S. policy. Washington also pledged to open a consulate in Dakhla—a Moroccan-controlled territory—although these plans have yet to come to fruition. 

This diplomatic reversal was a key component of the 2020 Abraham Accords, which later saw Israel recognize Rabat’s sovereignty over the contested territory, too. Israeli-Moroccan normalization has since led to a 2021 defense pact that covers intelligence and cooperation in military industries and procurement. Israel has since ramped up sales of drones and other equipment, including the Barak MX defense system, to the North African kingdom.

Rabat has made diplomatic inroads elsewhere, too, in its quest to secure overwhelming international support. Forty countries now back Morocco’s autonomy plan, including Brazil and Germany. International recognition of the SADR, however, once reaching a high of 84 governments, has now dwindled to 47 states.

Several European governments, including Madrid, have been even more forceful in their support for Rabat in recent years. But France’s announcement that it recognizes Morocco’s territorial claim could be a game changer. Paris has abandoned its long-standing position of neutrality in the conflict. This lands a further blow to the Polisario Front’s floundering diplomatic campaign. 

French President Emmanuel Macron conveyed this position in a letter to Morocco’s King Mohammed VI on July 30, which coincided with the 25th anniversary of his accession to the throne. The president wrote that “the present and future of Western Sahara lie within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.” He added further that “France’s support for the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco in 2007 is clear and unwavering.” This plan—which would provide for a degree of self-governance under Moroccan sovereignty—is, he argued, “the only basis to achieve a just, lasting, and negotiated political solution.” Macron therefore rejected any compromise that could lead to Sahrawi self-determination. It was a surprising volte-face amid souring relations between Paris and Rabat. Tensions between France and Algeria have since mounted instead, with the latter adopting retaliatory diplomatic measures. 

Paris’s decision to back Rabat’s autonomy plan has further shifted the tide of international support in the kingdom’s favor. It cements a growing international consensus of support for Morocco’s claims of sovereignty and it strengthens Rabat’s narrative, enhancing its capacity to inform the ongoing negotiation process. It will now be increasingly challenging for Algiers to retaliate against these diplomatic reversals—and thus deter other states—without plunging it into further isolation. International momentum is overwhelmingly on Rabat’s side.

In addition to Algeria, the PF has several influential allies: South Africa and Iran remain staunch diplomatic backers, while Russia has provided implicit support in international fora. As more Western governments side with Rabat, it would not be surprising if Russia, Iran, and other countries become more vociferous in their support for the PF—and may even begin to intervene more conspicuously. Indeed, Morocco has alleged that Tehran has supplied the PF with surface-to-air missiles and drones while Hezbollah has been training PF leaders in Algeria. There is thus little prospect for the complete collapse of the PF’s international standing. In short, France’s diplomatic decision is unlikely to erode support for the PF considerably beyond its present position. It may only hasten the bifurcation of global positioning on the conflict into two clear sides.

Fraying Regional Tensions

Algeria—home to most Sahrawi refugees—and Morocco have a quarrelsome history dating back to the early postcolonial period, when they fought the Sand War in 1963 over competing territorial claims. Relations have ebbed and flowed in the decades since. But evolving power dynamics and Rabat’s diplomatic ascendancy has deepened the rivalry as the competition for dominance in the Maghreb heats up. Algeria officially broke off diplomatic relations with Morocco in August 2021. 

Algiers supports the Polisario Front and its goal of independence from Rabat, and the PF’s ongoing survival is inextricably linked to the security guarantee it receives from its ally. There is a clear calculus underlying this support: It is a matter of critical national interest for Algiers. Complete Moroccan control over the contested territory would increase the kingdom’s strategic depth, resolve a long-standing territorial dispute in its favor, and represent a conspicuous failure of a core tenet of Algerian foreign policy. For decades, opposing Rabat by backing the PF has provided Algiers with a low-cost opportunity to contain Morocco’s rise. 

Ideological sympathies for Sahrawi self-determination also undergird Algerian foreign policy, although it is not clear whether a new cadre of elites will maintain the same intensity of conviction. In any event, Macron’s announcement alone will not compromise Algeria’s support for the PF. For Morocco, control over Western Sahara guarantees its territorial integrity over an important strategic location along the Atlantic Coast. The contested territory is also rich in rock phosphate—a key Moroccan export—and the hotspot of the nation’s fishing industry. Importantly, Rabat views the PF as an Algerian proxy.

The collapse of the ceasefire has aggravated bilateral friction as fears of escalation abound. Several destabilizing incidents have threatened to expand the conflict to the broader region. This includes a reported Moroccan drone strike in PF-controlled territory that led to the deaths of three Algerian truck drivers. More recently, the Algerian coast guard fatally shot two Moroccan nationals on jet skis, claiming they had entered the nation’s territorial waters. Concerningly, the two rivals have also bolstered their military capabilities and are now among the continent’s top three arms buyers. 

The prospect for reconciliation, for now, appears faint. Both sides have sought to avoid escalation, however, as their contained responses to these destabilizing incidents highlight. This is encouraging. But the limited regional repercussions thus far should not lull local or external actors into a false sense of security. As tensions continue to fray—and as Western Sahara becomes an ever more luminous flashpoint—they threaten to engulf the region in a spiral of instability. 

Prospects for Peace

This regional context will have a strong bearing on the prospects for peace in Western Sahara. As Morocco sees the Polisario Front as an Algerian surrogate, it is insistent that only a grand bargain that includes Algeria will resolve the conflict. While the PF demands direct bilateral talks with Rabat to decide the terms for a referendum, any deal would require the backing of Algeria, too.

Following the collapse of the ceasefire, the international response has been marred by inaction. External powers have been reluctant to step into what they perceive as a low-priority dispute. The U.S., trusted by both sides, has proved to be a critical interlocutor. But President Biden’s careful balancing act between Rabat and Algiers—and his unwillingness to invest significant political capital in the dispute—has done little to move negotiations along. He has refused to backtrack on Trump’s recognition of Morocco’s claim over Western Sahara. Other external powers, meanwhile, lack the credibility or the interest to serve as an active mediator in the U.S.’s place, including Spain and the African Union.

A divided Security Council failed at first to take a stance on negotiations. But this changed in October 2021 after a U.S. campaign to fill the UN’s long-vacant envoy position succeeded. Staffan de Mistura—a veteran diplomat—was appointed to the position, overcoming objections from both Rabat and the PF. He made his first visit to Western Sahara in September 2023, and he continues to meet a wide range of local stakeholders and external actors. This includes the PF’s representative to the UN and Morocco’s foreign minister. This has presented a glimmer of hope for the resumption of peace negotiations. 

But since then, there has been minimal progress. De Mistura operates within a narrowing policy space with limited leverage. While both sides engage with the envoy, Rabat and the PF have vastly divergent negotiating positions. Morocco insists on returning to the 2019 roundtable format that featured Mauritania and Algeria at the negotiating table, too. It also refuses to make further concessions beyond its 2007 autonomy plan.

The PF, meanwhile, maintains its maximalist ambitions of independence. It seeks to return to the 1991 UN-mediated proposal for a referendum on self-determination. This is a very large gap to bridge with few confidence-building measures that could ease the process. It is complicated further by other tough questions—including the future status of Sahrawi refugees—that Macron’s announcement will do nothing to resolve. 

There are also powerful incentives among the conflict’s principal actors to lengthen the conflict and stall negotiations. For the PF, any negotiated settlement could be politically unpalatable, as such an agreement would contravene the core tenet of the PF’s maximalist political agenda. It is not clear how the PF could possibly frame a settlement short of independence as a victory for the Sahrawi people; the resumption of hostilities, after all, had broad support in the Sahrawi refugee camps, particularly among youth. Even if the PF succeeded in this, its image would be tarnished, and its ongoing viability under a new political arrangement would not be assured. 

For Algiers, prolonging the status quo maintains a very large thorn in Morocco’s side and checks its expansionism. It also diverts domestic attention from its internal issues amid an upcoming Algerian election. For Moroccan hardliners, an extended conflict could see the destruction of the PF and a significantly weakened negotiating position for pro-independence Sahrawis. And for pro-Rabat Sahrawis in Moroccan-controlled territory, the resolution of the dispute may put to an end decades of political patronage from Rabat. 

This web of incentives can be inevitably overcome with the right admixture of sweeteners and counterincentives. But given the degree of divergence in negotiating positions that would persist, any compromise that could lead to a settlement still appears unlikely for now. This seems to be the case even if Morocco were to offer concessions beyond its autonomy plan. 

At the same time, there is very little prospect of either side ending the conflict militarily. The PF does not have the capabilities to do so, or even to improve its negotiating position measurably. Morocco—for now—does not have the appetite, seeking to avert the confrontation with Algeria and the reversal of its diplomatic fortune that could result. Current low-level hostilities can persist at low cost to both sides. The status quo is set to continue. 

Something momentous will have to change to move the needle toward peace. Macron’s announcement does not meet this threshold. At present, the greatest hurdle to an agreement appears to be the PF’s maximalist objectives, which seem almost impossible to achieve. Perhaps, over time, war-weariness or a complete collapse in diplomatic support will compel the Sahrawi people to make challenging yet necessary concessions toward a universally acceptable compromise. 

But this is unlikely to happen soon. Any optimism for a decisive conclusion to the conflict is premature. In fact, it may be entirely misplaced as regional tensions intensify and Algeria and the PF find themselves increasingly isolated. It seems that Western Sahara will continue to suffer with no end in sight.

– Marcus Ray graduated from the University of Oxford with a BA in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. He was the Michael von Clemm Fellow at Harvard University, where he studied government. He now studies law in London and works in the UK House of Commons. Published courtesy of Lawfare.