President Donald Trump’s executive order withdrawing the US from the Paris Agreement raises the question of the implications for small African Indian Ocean island states.
The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change. It entered into force in November 2016 and aims to limit global temperature rises below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels.
The executive order, “Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements”, signifies the intention of the US to withdraw from this agreement.
The 2025 order also revokes any purported financial commitment made by the US under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, including the Green Climate Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund.
Trump has also dismantled the US Office of Global Change, which is responsible for international climate negotiations.
At the Ocean Regions Programme of the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, we are interested in what Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement could mean for African Indian Ocean island states, including Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles.
Our earlier research on Pacific Island states indicated that those neglected by major powers strategically diversified their relations. In 2021, Solomon Islands, for example, turned to China for security assistance. That prompted Australia to re-engage and extend its initial security assistance to the end of 2023. Similarly, Fiji turned its attention from Australia to China in 2018, lauding its climate leadership. This resulted in a renewed effort by the US to demonstrate greater support for the Pacific Islands’ priorities.
African Island states could pursue similar strategies as long as the US commitment to climate action remains inconsistent.
Although they are responsible for 0.2% of global carbon emissions, small island states suffer the most severe impact from climate change. Mauritius, for example, is experiencing a rise in sea levels of 2-3 times higher than the global average. Climate change is expected to displace 10% of the Comoros’ coastal inhabitants and destroy infrastructure worth more than 2.2 times its gross domestic product.
Trump’s 2017 withdrawal
Trump first tried to withdraw in 2017. That lasted only 77 days because the Paris Agreement prohibits formal withdrawal notifications until three years after its entry into force. Still, this brief period undermined international accord on climate action.
In the Western Indian Ocean, it had varying impacts on island states, depending on their reliance on the US.
Less dependent on US foreign aid, Seychelles pursued climate action through ocean-based initiatives. It converted US$21.6 million of debt into the world’s first blue economy debt-for-nature swap and launched the first sovereign blue bond. This was designed to write off the national debt in return for the creation of Marine Protected Areas, which span over 30% of its Exclusive Economic Zone. The blue bond directed funds raised specifically to projects that are ocean-friendly.
These efforts were supported by the Seychelles Conservation and Climate Adaptation Trust, an organisation established through the world’s first debt swap for ocean conservation and climate adaption in 2015, and partners like The Nature Conservancy (an NGO) and the World Bank. They minimised the effects of losing US contributions to the Green Climate Fund.
Comoros would have been more affected. The Green Climate Fund is spending US$41.9 million on a project to secure climate resilient water supplies between 2019 and 2027.
Trump’s second round
The earliest date the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement could take effect is January 2026, based on Article 28. The US contributes 21% of the UN’s climate secretariat budget, and its exit could cost poorer nations at least US$11 billion.
A key impact on African island states could be the loss of support from the Green Climate Fund. In 2023, the Biden administration committed US$3 billion to this fund, matching the Obama administration’s 2014 pledge and making the US the fund’s largest single contributor.
Trump has rescinded any outstanding pledges made by the US to the fund.
The fund is currently supporting four projects in Seychelles (US$34.3 million), four projects in Comoros (US$66.7 million), and six projects in Mauritius (US$86.1 million).
In March 2025, the US also withdrew from the Loss and Damage Fund, possibly reversing Biden’s US$17.5 million pledge.
Established in 2022 to assist developing countries with the loss and damage associated with the effects of climate change, the fund was strongly advocated by Small Island Developing States, including Mauritius and Seychelles.
Beyond funding cuts, Trump’s withdrawal may weaken global climate ambition. Some argue his election emboldened Saudi Arabia’s defence of fossil fuels at the COP29 climate conference and weakened global climate commitment.
There are also concerns that Trump’s dismissive attitude may create a leadership deficit in climate action. This may push African island states to seek alternative partners.
Lessons from small Pacific Island states
In the Pacific, the reaction to Trump’s latest withdrawal was characterised by concern. The Cook Islands underscored its reliance on the Green Climate Fund and the need to now search for alternative global climate funding. Palau’s president, Surangel Whipps Jr, said this “would be a fantastic opportunity to take him (Donald Trump) snorkelling and see the impacts”.
Some Pacific Island states have responded to unfulfilled and inadequate commitments to their interests by seeking alternative partners. Due to inadequate support from Australia, Fiji and the Solomon Islands have turned to others, including China. The region has demonstrated agency by strategically shifting alliances, prompting major players to reassess their approach.
Pacific Island states have united through the Pacific Islands Forum. They have declared climate change the single greatest threat to their security and defined the region as the Blue Pacific Continent and the Ocean of Peace.
Their unified advocacy has influenced global engagement, as seen in the US-Pacific Partnership Declaration, which strongly supported the interests of the Pacific Islands and was in harmony with the Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. How withdrawal from Paris agreement will affect the US-Pacific Partnership Declaration under Trump is yet to be seen.
What African islands can do
Pacific Islands have successfully used alternative partnerships to push Australia to re-engage on their terms.
African island states can adopt a similar approach, using Trump’s climate stance as an opportunity to diversify alliances. While the objective may not necessarily be to influence the US into reevaluating its position, this diversification of international relationships could naturally lead to such an outcome.
African Indian Ocean islands should also continue to forge closer ties with partners such as the European Union (EU), as they are already successfully doing, and with China within the latter’s global south climate and energy partnership frameworks.
In March 2025, the EU announced a US$5 billion investment package to fund green energy projects in South Africa, after the US withdrew from the Just Energy Transition Partnership. Islands could also look to the EU, which might also enhance their bargaining power in multilateral forums.
Island states should continue to advocate for climate change action through regional organisations, such as:
- the Indian Ocean Commission
- the African Island States Climate Commission
- the Indian Ocean Rim Association.
Initiatives such as the Great Blue Wall, started by a former president of Seychelles, should continue to receive support from continental organisations such as the African Union and African Development Bank.
Although the climate crisis has largely been caused by highly industrialised countries, the current US attitude towards climate change means that small islands and other most vulnerable states need increasingly diverse sources of support for survival.
Daniela Marggraff, Researcher, Oceans Regions Programme, University of Pretoria; Maxi Schoeman, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, University of Pretoria, and Samuel Oyewole, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.
