As 2024 draws to a close, the United States is on the cusp of a significant political transition. In just weeks, President-elect Donald Trump will once again assume the presidency. This shift has sparked widespread debate over the direction of U.S. domestic and foreign policy under Trump’s renewed leadership. Yet, one critical area that has garnered relatively little attention is the future of America’s airstrikes and ground operations in Somalia.
Will Trump increase the pace and number of U.S. strikes and operations in Somalia, and what would be the implications for civilian harm? While attempts to forecast Trump’s foreign policy remain speculative, understanding the current state of America’s operations in Somalia is crucial. Establishing a clear baseline of U.S. activity under the Biden administration is essential for meaningful analysis of what may lie ahead. This requires not only a meticulous examination of strike data but also a commitment to maintaining—and expanding—transparency around U.S. military operations in Somalia. Only then can policymakers, analysts, and the public fully grasp the implications of what comes next.
Past as Prelude to Trump’s Drone Policies in Somalia?
To forecast the future trajectory of America’s war in Somalia under Trump, various analytical lenses can be applied. A compelling starting point is to examine Trump’s past statements, actions, and policies regarding drone strikes, counterterrorism, and U.S. involvement in Somalia.
Analysis of Trump’s record on Somalia, however, does not lead to a clear answer. Trump substantially increased strikes in Somalia. In 2017, according to New America’s tracking, Trump conducted twice as many strikes in Somalia as President Obama had in 2016 and, unlike in other countries, the number of strikes remained high throughout the Trump administration.
On the other hand, Trump decided to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia at the very end of his administration (although some strikes continued), a policy that Biden then reversed. Internal debates over the withdrawal point to Trump’s skepticism about the strategic importance of military operations in Somalia.
Trump also embraced an aggressive approach to America’s use of counterterrorism strikes globally. The Trump administration replaced Obama-era guidance known as the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), which included limitations on where, when, and how strikes could be conducted, with its own guidance known as the Principles, Standards, and Procedures (PSP). The PSP loosened some of the PPG’s restrictions and delegated greater decision-making authority about when to conduct strikes to commanders. Trump is unlikely to retain the Biden administration’s guidance, possibly replacing it with something akin to the PSP. What such an approach would mean for the trajectory of the war in Somalia, however, is far from clear, as Trump’s first term saw great variation in the number and approach to strikes.
During the 2015-16 presidential campaign, Trump’s rhetoric signaled an instinct for escalation, as he promised to “quickly and decisively bomb the hell out of ISIS.” Trump also criticized the existing war as “politically correct” while arguing for the killing of terrorists’ families (a war crime). According to one report, while being shown prerecorded video of a CIA drone strike, Trump questioned why the CIA waited for a target to move away from his family before firing at the suspected terrorist. The number of strikes surged in Trump’s first year, not just in Somalia, but also in Yemen, where the United States conducted an unprecedented 131 counterterrorism strikes. In Iraq and Syria, the Trump administration also oversaw a campaign (largely devised during the Obama presidency) to retake major cities from ISIS. However, caution is required in interpreting the initial spike in strikes as having been driven primarily by Trump’s aggressive instincts. The surge in strikes reflected a particular moment. Operations were already increasing under expanded authorities in a variety of contexts before Trump took office, as the threat from ISIS and other groups stoked concern. By the end of Trump’s first term, strikes had substantially declined in many locations (although Somalia did not see a substantial decline in strikes in the administration’s final years).
Another way to approach this analysis is by examining the perspectives of key officials in Trump’s incoming administration. However, with the team still being assembled—and featuring members from competing ideological factions—caution is necessary, particularly regarding a traditionally peripheral arena such as U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia.
Alternatively, focusing on the conditions on the ground in Somalia might offer valuable insights. To a large extent, U.S. strikes in Somalia and elsewhere follow trends across administrations related to conditions on the ground, rather than decision-making in Washington. Additionally, recent strikes have typically been justified as collective self-defense of partner forces, suggesting they mirror the ebb and flow of battlefield developments.
Yet, considerable uncertainty exists about how the world will react to a second Trump presidency, compounded by general unpredictability about future events in Somalia and the broader region – a point illustrated by the sudden collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. This uncertainty may obscure attempts to predict the future based on current battlefield conditions.
Strikes Under Biden: Establishing a Baseline for Analysis
One thing, however, is clear. To understand and accurately track how the new administration changes the war in Somalia, it is essential to have a good understanding of the details of the war the Biden administration will hand over.
Upon taking office, the Biden administration initially instituted a general pause on U.S. strikes, including in Somalia, as it reviewed U.S. counterterrorism policy. However, by the middle of Biden’s first year in office, the United States had returned to conducting strikes in Somalia. According to New America’s independent tracking, the number of strikes then increased year-over-year in 2022 and 2023, although never reaching the heights they did under the Trump administration.
Over the past year, the number of U.S. air and drone strikes, as well as ground operations, in Somalia appears to have declined. In 2023, the United States acknowledged conducting 18 strikes and one ground operation in Somalia. So far in 2024, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has acknowledged conducting only eight strikes. (See also New America’s tracking here). On December 5, AFRICOM told this author that its last strike was carried out on July 15, 2024, a four month pause that appears to be ongoing. In both 2023 and 2024, New America recorded one alleged strike that AFRICOM denied. Airwars, which relies on more expansive criteria for recording airstrikes, recorded even more alleged strikes.
It is of course possible that the United States has conducted airstrikes this year that AFRICOM has not acknowledged. It is also possible that the United States will conduct multiple strikes in the remaining weeks of 2024. For example, three of the 19 strikes and operations AFRICOM acknowledged conducting in 2023 occurred in December of last year, after a four month pause that began in the summer.
Assessing the Types of Strikes Being Conducted
The eight known airstrikes conducted by AFRICOM in Somalia in 2024 can be divided into three basic kinds of operations: (1) Targeted strikes that were intended to kill specific al-Shabaab and Islamic State leaders in Somalia, (2) Strikes that were carried out in response to complex al-Shabaab attacks, and (3) Airstrikes that were deemed to be collective self-defense but do not appear to have been conducted in immediate response to complex attacks by either al-Shabaab or ISIS fighters.
On at least two occasions in 2024, AFRICOM targeted specific al-Shabaab and ISIS leaders. In a War Powers Resolution Letter, dated June 7, 2024, President Biden wrote: “Since the last periodic report, United States Armed Forces have conducted two strikes against al-Shabaab high-value targets and a number of airstrikes in Somalia against al-Shabaab in defense of our Somali partner forces when engaged with al-Shabaab and our support is requested to defend them against attack.” President Biden’s War Powers letter provided an update to a prior periodic report dated December 7, 2023. It appears that the president was referring to two airstrikes against al-Shabaab, one of which occurred in December of last year.
In response to an inquiry from this author, AFRICOM confirmed two cases (as referenced in President Biden’s letter) in which it conducted targeted attacks on al-Shabaab between December 7, 2023 and June 7, 2024. Both occurred in the vicinity of Jilib, a city in southern Somalia. The first occurred on December 17, 2023. (For a discussion of the context surrounding the airstrike, as well as the target, see here). The second targeted strike against al-Shabaab was launched on February 15, 2024. AFRICOM’s target in this latter operation is unclear, and the strike is the subject of an alleged civilian casualty incident detailed below.
On May 31, 2024, AFRICOM said it struck “ISIS militants” near Bosaso, a city in northern Somalia on the coast of the Gulf of Aden. U.S. officials told media outlets that the intended target was Abdulqadir Mumin, a U.S.-designated terrorist who serves as the “head” of ISIS’s “general directorate of provinces,” a position that places him within the organization’s global hierarchy. Some have suggested that Mumin was named the top global leader of ISIS itself (the new so-called “caliph”), but a U.N. panel of experts recently reported that it found “no evidence to substantiate that claim.” In any event, the airstrike seemingly failed to kill Mumin.
At least one airstrike in 2024 may have been conducted in response to a complex al-Shabaab attack and was labeled a collective self-defense operation. On January 24, AFRICOM carried out an airstrike in the vicinity of Caad, Somalia, stating that six al-Shabaab terrorists were killed. That same day al-Shabaab carried out a multipronged attack on a military base in Caad, utilizing suicide vehicular bombs, a marker of complex attacks.
Some of AFRICOM’s airstrikes in 2024 were labeled as collective self-defense operations, but do not appear to have followed complex attacks by either al-Shabaab or ISIS fighters. For example, on March 10, 2024, the United States conducted an operation near Ugunji, southeast of Mogadishu. The press release labeled it as a “collective self-defense airstrike.” However, reporting suggests it did not follow a complex attack, but was instead aimed at neutralizing a threat from al-Shabaab forces that were regrouping to conduct an attack. Press reporting did not provide any details of what the potential attack may have looked like had it not been prevented.
In tracking the U.S. war in Somalia under the second Trump administration, it will be important to monitor if the changes come only with regard to particular kinds of strikes or across the board. During the first Trump administration, AFRICOM conducted strikes that it framed as offensive targeting of al-Shabaab, as opposed to collective self-defense or the targeting of specific leaders.
There are significant concerns that the United States may be stretching the concept of collective self-defense to justify air support for offensive operations. Even so, military officials have distinguished collective self-defense strikes from offensive targeting of al-Shabaab infrastructure outside of the context of broader combat and questioned the value of offensive strikes of the type conducted during Trump’s first term. For example, in 2023, Rose Keravuori, Deputy Director of Intelligence at U.S. Africa Command, told West Point’s CTC Sentinel, “we are not doing offensive actions.” Regarding airstrikes, Keravuori added: “When the forces we support are being attacked, we will conduct airstrikes for collective self-defense. That is clearly there to support them, to show them we are here to support their operations. And that is absolutely necessary. The jury is out, I would say, on how effective offensive airstrikes would be.”
Whether offensive targeting of al-Shabaab en-masse returns will be an issue to watch. One indicator to keep an eye on (beyond the actual conduct of strikes) is whether press releases and other military rhetoric cease to emphasize the collective self-defense character of strikes. Under Biden, collective self-defense provided an exception to stricter rules governing more targeted operations. If Trump promulgates laxer standards, the relevance of distinguishing strikes as collective self-defense may decline.
Assessing Reported Death Tolls and Civilian Casualties
Another area to monitor will be any change in the death toll of U.S. strikes and, in particular, any increase in the civilian death toll. It appears – at least based on AFRICOM’s acknowledged strikes and tallies – that the Biden administration is turning over a war with minimal civilian casualties, and relatively low casualties overall (that can be directly attributed to U.S. strikes).
Throughout 2024, according to a tally of AFRICOM’s press releases and replies to inquiries by this author, the U.S. military assessed that it killed 29 militants. That is an average of just under four militants killed per airstrike. This is lower than the average of just over six militants killed per strike (and one ground operation) in 2023.
As in 2023, AFRICOM so far assesses that it killed no civilians in its 2024 strikes.
However, one airstrike this year led to allegations of civilian deaths. The operation occurred on February 15, 2024, but AFRICOM did not issue a press release acknowledging it until February 28. During that two week period, al-Shabaab claimed that the strike killed two Cuban doctors the group had been holding hostage. Al-Shabaab’s release regarding the alleged deaths was dated February 17, 2024. The U.S. confirmed to media outlets by February 19 that it had conducted the strike, but AFRICOM did not post a press release for another nine days. AFRICOM later concluded an assessment of the alleged civilian deaths, finding that it did not kill the two hostages. However, Cuba’s Foreign Ministry has questioned the investigation’s reliability. Despite raising questions, Cuba has not confirmed whether the doctors were killed in the operation.
Airwars, which also tracks U.S. strikes in Somalia, has recorded other cases of alleged civilian casualties, although many of these casualties are from strikes where responsibility is contested or where the allegation of an operation is based on a single source. Even so, Airwars’ data still appears to show that the number of civilian casualties in 2024 is lower than during the Trump administration.
Difficulty of Attributing U.S. Strikes in a Crowded Battlefield
A final issue that will challenge efforts to understand the Trump administration’s approach to Somalia is the growing role of the Somali government and other states in conducting drone strikes against terrorist groups operating in the country.
On March 18, 2024, a drone strike reportedly killed more than 20 people, including 14 children, outside Mogadishu. A variety of reporting, including weapons analysis by Amnesty International, indicates that a large number of civilians were killed in a strike conducted by Turkey or by Somali forces using Turkish drones. The likely Turkish (or Turkish supported) strike demonstrates the presence of belligerents capable of drone strikes in Somalia other than the United States.
The strike emphasizes the challenge of tracking U.S. oeprations in a crowded battlefield. For example, by Airwars’ tally, which uses a broader inclusion criteria than New America, there was a massive increase in alleged strikes in Somalia in 2023. However, these alleged strikes likely included not only those conducted by the United States, but also other actors – and in some cases sources did not even specifically allege a U.S. role.
The challenge with attributing drone strikes in Somalia to specific state actors underscores the difficulty of accurately assessing the number of U.S. strikes in the next Trump administration. Strikes from other countries that are misattributed to the United States might make it appear as though there is a spike in American activity even when that is not the case. At the same time, the United States has a history of conducting covert strikes and portraying them as the responsibility of other countries. Even today, questions persist around whether the United States was responsible for a set of strikes that reportedly killed a senior Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula figure in Yemen in early 2023. The combination of proliferating drone capabilities with a history (and possibly ongoing practice) of covert strikes passed off as others’ operations complicates analysis of the trajectory of the war in Somalia under Trump.
Trump’s prior comments and actions raise concern about the potential for an expansion of covert operations. In addition to backtracking on transparency around strikes in his prior term, Trump reportedly asked then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, during their discussions of potentially carrying out military operations against drug cartels in Mexico, if the United States could blame another country for American strikes.
The possibility that the Trump administration may seek to conduct its operations covertly will place a premium on expanding transparency. In the absence of improved transparency, it will fall to reporters and independent trackers of strikes to once again take up what should be primarily the government’s duty, carefully parsing the available reporting and official statements in order to enable the American people to understand the war its government is waging in Somalia.
